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20Track

IO::Socket::SSL::PublicSuffix versions through 2.099 for Perl let an on-path attacker choose the…

· CVE-2026-129891
0 news outlets0 CERTs and agencies1 research labs

Assessment: Track

SSVC decision points: exploitation none, automatable yes, technical impact partial, deployment low.

What is it?

IO::Socket::SSL::PublicSuffix versions through 2.099 for Perl let an on-path attacker choose the installed public suffix list because update_self_from_url fetches it over cleartext HTTP with no integrity check. Called with no argument, as the module's documentation shows, the updater fetches the list from the `http://` address in the URL constant and checks only that the request succeeded, with no signature or digest over the response. The lines that come back are written into the module's own source file as the built-in list. An attacker on the network path when the updater runs chooses the suffix boundary the module reports to every caller on the host, and that answer persists in the installed module until it is reinstalled. Dropping one rule makes the hostname check in IO::Socket::SSL accept a wildcard certificate that spans the whole public suffix that rule named.

Evidence

Technical advisories1Detailed write-ups from security research teams

Exploitation

  • Exploit code published (not verified by us)
  • Exploited in the wild (confirmed by a source)
  • Listed as known exploited (CISA KEV)
CVSS
7.5
EPSS
0.1%
First seen
1 d ago
Status
corroborated