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Password-based KDF cost parameters honoured unbounded from untrusted input across the remaining PBE entry points

Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. BC-FJA · CVE-2026-17508
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What is it?

In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, several password-based key derivation entry points ran the KDF with cost parameters taken from the untrusted input being processed, without bounding them, so a small input could dictate an arbitrary amount of work before any password or integrity check could reject it. The affected paths are the RFC 9579 PBMAC1 MAC calculator builders, which took the PBKDF2 iteration count and derived-key length straight out of PBMAC1Params (JcePBMac1CalculatorBuilder, and PKCS12PBEUtils.createPBMac1Calculator reached from PKCS12PfxPdu.isMacValid); the scrypt parallelization parameter p in the PKCS#8 and PKCS#12 cost guards, which bounded only the cost parameter N and the block size r even though the scratch buffer scales with r times p, so the configured memory ceiling could be evaded entirely; the raw JCA PBKDF2 provider (org.bouncycastle.jcajce.provider.symmetric.PBEPBKDF2); and the bcrypt round count read from an encrypted OpenSSH v1 private key's own kdfoptions. Each now bounds the parameter before deriving, in line with the caps already applied elsewhere in the tree, with the OpenSSH round count configurable through the new org.bouncycastle.openssh.max_r

Evidence

No coverage recorded yet.

Exploitation

  • Public proof of concept
  • Exploited in the wild
  • Listed as known exploited
CVSS
5.3
EPSS
0.4%
First seen
7 d ago
Status
corroborated

All Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. vulnerabilities