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jackson-core: Number length constraint bypass in non-blocking (async) JSON parser leads to potential denial of service

FasterXML jackson-core · CVE-2026-18401
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What is it?

The non-blocking (asynchronous) JSON parser in jackson-core does not enforce the maxNumberLength constraint defined in StreamReadConstraints (default: 1000 characters). An attacker able to submit JSON to an application that uses the async parser API can supply a number token of arbitrary length, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a denial of service. The synchronous parser enforces this limit correctly, so the constraint is applied inconsistently depending on which parsing API the application uses. Root cause: the async parsing path in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase and related classes never invokes the number length validation methods. Number parsing methods such as _finishNumberIntegralPart() accumulate digits into the TextBuffer without any length check, then call _valueComplete() to finalize the token. _valueComplete() does not call resetInt() or resetFloat(), which are the methods in ParserBase where validateIntegerLength() and validateFPLength() are performed. Because that validation step is skipped, maxNumberLength is never enforced on the async code path. Impact: an attacker sending a JSON document containing an arbitra

Evidence

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Exploitation

  • Public proof of concept
  • Exploited in the wild
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CVSS
6.9
EPSS
0.4%
First seen
7 d ago
Status
corroborated

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