How it works

Vulnocalypse reads vulnerability registries, government CERTs, vendor advisories, research blogs and newsrooms around the clock, links everything that refers to the same vulnerability, and only shows what passes automated validation.

AI second reader

Vulnocalypse’s rules decide which articles belong to which vulnerability. Claude (Haiku, by Anthropic) then re-reads the uncertain cases: whether an article is really about the vulnerability, whether it says the flaw is being exploited, and whether a reported service shutdown really happened. It can only remove or downgrade, never add. It also translates non-English headlines and writes the “In plain English” summaries, which are labelled as AI-written. Only public articles and public vulnerability data are sent to it.

Social chatter

Vulnocalypse notes public Bluesky posts that mention a vulnerability’s identifier or name (through Bluesky’s public Jetstream), and public Fediverse and Bluesky sightings collected by CIRCL’s Vulnerability-Lookup. Only the account, a link to the post and its time are kept, for 90 days; post text is not stored. Deleted posts are removed, automated accounts that repost every new vulnerability are left out, and accounts that ask not to be shown to logged-out visitors are never shown. To have your account excluded, email contact@vulnocalypse.com. Social chatter shows attention, not risk, and isn’t part of the assessment.

Privacy

Vulnocalypse counts visits without cookies and without storing IP addresses or anything on your device. A visit is recognised only within the same day, so nobody can be followed over time. Browsers that send Global Privacy Control or Do Not Track aren’t counted at all.

What gets into the feed

A vulnerability enters the feed when it is corroborated (a published CVE record, or at least two independent organisations) and new (published in the last 60 days, newly listed as known exploited, or newly reported as exploited), and its assessment is Act, or Attend with a ranking score of 60 or more. Critical vulnerabilities that are major news before anyone exploits them (Track* with CERTs in three or more countries, or five or more outlets) are included too.

Exploitation status

We only mark something exploited when there is a citable source: a KEV listing (CISA, VulnCheck or ENISA), a statement from the vendor or a government agency, CISA’s SSVC assessment, or at least two independent organisations reporting attacks with no later denial from the vendor. Phrases like “no evidence of exploitation” are detected and count against a claim.

Validation, without humans

Identifiers are checked against the CVE List; rejected or non-existent CVEs are dropped. Titles, vendors, products and CVSS come from the official record rather than from headlines. Wire stories syndicated across outlets are counted once. Roundups that list dozens of CVEs only count the ones they actually discuss. Reports without an identifier wait for corroboration and are merged into the right CVE once one is assigned. Every decision is logged and shown on each vulnerability’s page.

The Panic meter

Three numbers over the past 24 hours, counting only vulnerabilities first seen in the last 14 days: distinct research labs publishing about them, distinct news organisations covering them, and distinct CERTs and agencies warning about them. Each is ranked against its own 90-day history, weighted 20% people talking on Bluesky and the Fediverse (bots left out), 20% research labs, 30% CERTs and 30% news, and stretched so the top levels stay rare. Until there are 14 days of history, each is compared with a “busy day” that grows with the number of sources monitored and is never below the busiest day so far. The meter itself is a rolling 24 hours; the daily chart shows calendar days. Each day’s score is split across the vulnerabilities that caused it.

The outbreak map

The map shows three things for every country: how many national news outlets are covering new vulnerabilities, whether the national CERT or cyber security agency has issued a warning, and whether services were taken offline because of a vulnerability (the unplug icon: confirmed when the country’s own CERT or national press reports it, or two independent outlets do). National outlets are read directly, through local-language Google News editions, and through GDELT, which attributes coverage in over 100 languages to its source country. International security press is left off the map so it shows national attention, not trade coverage. Replay the spread to watch a vulnerability travel from patient zero across the world.

Subscribe

• Everything (RSS), also as Atom and JSON Feed
• Exploited only and KEV-listed only
• Updates: new KEV listings, exploitation changes and public exploits for tracked vulnerabilities
• Per vendor: /feed.xml?vendor=Fortinet, or by score: /feed.xml?min_score=80

Use it from an AI agent

Vulnocalypse runs a read-only MCP server. Add it to any MCP client as a remote server:

https://vulnocalypse.com/mcp

Tools: get_feed, search_vulnerabilities, get_vulnerability, check_exposure (send the products you run and get back anything that affects them), get_panic and explain_panic_day. The JSON API is documented at /api/docs.

How a vulnerability is assessed

Each vulnerability gets a decision from SSVC, CISA’s Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization: Act, Attend, Track* or Track. It rests on four decision points, each shown with where its value came from:

• Exploitation (none, proof of concept, active): from the evidence on the page: listings in known-exploited catalogues (CISA KEV, VulnCheck KEV, ENISA), statements by the vendor or a government agency, independent reports from at least two organisations, and public exploit code. When CISA’s own SSVC assessment in the CVE record says more, that is used and named.
• Automatable (yes, no): CISA’s SSVC value when it exists; otherwise from the CVSS vector (network attack, low complexity, no privileges, no user interaction).
• Technical impact (partial, total): CISA’s SSVC value when it exists; otherwise from the CVSS vector (full loss of confidentiality and integrity) or a confirmed remote code execution.
• Deployment: SSVC’s mission and well-being point depends on the organisation. As a public baseline we assume a typical organisation running the product, and use how widely the product is deployed (internet-facing devices, identity systems, hypervisors, operating systems, browsers and common libraries count as high). Your own decision can differ: a product you don’t run is always Track for you.

Next to the decision, every page shows the evidence it rests on: exploitation evidence with sources and dates; CVSS from the CNA, CISA and NVD, with disagreements between them flagged; affected and fixed versions; the EPSS probability of exploitation in the next 30 days (the probability itself, not its percentile); and public attention, which is shown but is never part of the decision. Missing data is listed rather than guessed: for example “NVD has not assessed it yet” or “internet exposure not measured”.

The number on each entry is a ranking score for sorting. It never contradicts the decision: every Act ranks above every Attend. Within a decision it orders entries by EPSS probability, CVSS, deployment and whether the exploit is weaponised (a Metasploit module, an exploit proven by Ethiack Zero, or use in ransomware).

Checking ourselves. The assessment made when a vulnerability is first seen is stored, and 30 days later it is compared with what happened: did it get exploited or listed as known exploited? We measure how often each decision was followed by exploitation, and whether the ranking predicts exploitation better than CVSS or EPSS alone. We’ll publish the results here once there are enough assessments to be meaningful.

Limits. Internet exposure (how many vulnerable systems are reachable) is not measured yet. EPSS is unavailable for the first days after a CVE is published. Decision points derived from CVSS inherit the CVSS author’s judgement, which is why the source of each value is shown.